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THE DANGER OF NONRANDOM CASE ASSIGNMENT:   
HOW THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK’S “RELATED CASES” RULE HAS 






The Southern District of New York’s local rules are clear:  “[A]ll active judges . . . shall 
be assigned substantially an equal share of the categories of cases of the court over a period of 
time.”  Yet for the past fourteen years, Southern District Judge Scheindlin has been granted near-
exclusive jurisdiction over one category of case:  those involving wide-sweeping constitutional 
challenges to the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk policies.  In 1999, Judge Scheindlin was randomly 
assigned Daniels v. City of New York, the first in a series of high-profile and high-impact stop-
and-frisk cases.  Since then, she has overseen an uninterrupted stream of equally landmark stop-
and-frisk cases, which culminated in an August 12, 2013 order granting a sweeping injunction 
against the NYPD.  The cases were assigned according to the Southern District’s “related cases” 
local rule, which allows judges to “accept” a new case related to an earlier-filed case already on 
their docket.  Unlike past stop-and-frisk scholarship, this article addresses the procedural rules 
that have shaped the development of stop-and-frisk law, arguing that case assignment rules 
should not permit any district judge to exert total control over the evolution of significant 
Constitutional jurisprudence.   
 
The article begins by challenging the commonly-held assumption that federal cases are 
assigned to district judges at random.  It explains that although random assignment is widely 
assumed and generally heralded, it is not enforceable.  Instead, district courts retain discretion to 
assign cases as they wish, with little (if any) obligation for transparency.  The article looks 
specifically to the Southern District of New York’s Local Rules, examining the numerous ways in 
which cases are assigned to specific judges according to the cases’ subject matter, through a 
system hidden from the public and devoid of oversight.  The article then traces stop-and-frisk 
litigation from its roots in Terry v. Ohio to the complex and protracted stop-and-frisk cases filed 
in federal courts across the country today.  It explains how police have utilized stop-and-frisk 
practices before and after Terry, focusing on the Giuliani-era theory of “hot-spot policing.”  The 
article turns to the stop-and-frisk litigation before Judge Scheindlin, using it to examine the 
serious—and substantive—consequences of nonrandom case assignment in an adversary system.  
Nonrandom assignment allows an interested judge to inject herself into the litigation as a player 
with a stake in the outcome.  Giving one district judge power over an entire category of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence elevates her decisions to a quasi-appellate level of significance, 
violating the principle that a district court opinion is not binding on any court within the same 
district.  The article proposes amendments to the Southern District’s Local Rules to prohibit 
manipulation of case assignments, and advocates for the publication of assignment decisions as 
well as for motion practice challenging the assignments.  Finally, it warns of the impact Judge 
Scheindlin’s control over this area of the law may have if appealed to the Supreme Court.  Her 
decisions take a broad view of a plaintiff’s right to enforce the Fourth Amendment.  Yet because 
her interpretation is so broad, her decisions may be reversed, and the rights at stake narrowed.
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The verdict on the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk policies has been rendered.  On August 
12, 2013, in a 198-page order that followed a three-month bench trial, Southern District 
of New York Judge Scheindlin granted a sweeping injunction against the NYPD, 
ordering changes to NYPD policies and activities, appointing a monitor to oversee stop-
and-frisk practices, requiring a “community-based joint remedial process to be conducted 
by a court-appointed facilitator,” and, most remarkably, requiring the NYPD to place 
body-worn cameras on its police officers.
2
  The verdict received worldwide attention.  
But this was not Judge Scheindlin’s first stab at a wide-sweeping, high-impact stop-and-
frisk decision.  Despite the mountain of attention paid to New York City’s stop-and-frisk 
practices and the litigation before Judge Scheindlin, it has gone remarkably unnoticed 
that the same judge has held court over a stream of similar cases for the past fourteen 
years. 
How can this be?  After all, the Southern District of New York’s local rules are 
clear:  “all active judges, except the chief judge, shall be assigned substantially an equal 
share of the categories of cases of the court over a period of time.”
3
  Yet time and time 
again, cases involving wide-sweeping constitutional challenges to the NYPD’s stop-and-
frisk policies have been assigned to Judge Scheindlin.
4
  In 1999, she was randomly 
assigned Daniels v. City of New York, the first in a series of high-profile and high-impact 
stop-and-frisk cases.  In the fourteen years that followed Daniels’ filing, Judge Scheindlin 
                                                        
2
 Floyd v. City of New York, 08-cv-1034-SAS-HBP, Doc. 373 at 15 (Aug. 12, 2013). 
3
 LOCAL RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS FOR THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN DISTRICTS OF 
NEW YORK, RULES FOR THE DIVISION OF BUSINESS AMONG DISTRICT JUDGES, SOUTHERN DISTRICT 
(“DIVISION OF BUSINESS RULES”), RULE 1. 
4





has held court over an uninterrupted stream of additional and equally landmark stop-and-
frisk cases, but not through random case assignment procedures.  Instead, cases have 
been directed her way through the Southern District’s “related cases” rule.  The rule 
allows judges to “accept” later-filed cases if they are related to an earlier-filed case 
already on their docket.
5
  The decision to accept or reject the newly-filed case is within 
the “sole discretion” of the judge who received the earlier-filed case.
6
   
While such “discretion” may sound innocuous enough, in application, it can 
create serious structural problems.  Leaving the decision to accept or reject so-called 
“related cases” to the sole discretion of one judge, who will make the decision based on 
an understanding of the facts alleged in the later-filed case, as well as by evaluating its 
subject matter, injects that judge into the cases as something other than a neutral arbiter.  
The procedure allows litigation to be steered to a jurist with an interest in the case’s 
outcome.  This article contends that case assignment procedures should not permit any 
district judge to handpick high-impact litigation. 
The article begins by examining the commonly-held assumption that federal cases 
are assigned to district judges at random after they are filed.  It surveys the rare 
documented instances in which nonrandom assignment has been challenged, concluding 
that though random assignment is heralded, parties have no right to demand it.  Instead, 
district courts retain broad discretion to direct the manner in which cases are assigned to 
their judges.  In this context, the article looks to the Southern District of New York’s 
Local Rules, examining the numerous ways in cases are assigned pursuant to their subject 
matter, through a system hidden from the parties, and devoid of oversight.   
                                                        
5
 See DIVISION OF BUSINESS RULE 13. 
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The article then traces stop-and-frisk litigation, from Terry v. Ohio to the 
politically charged, complex and protracted stop-and-frisk litigation fought in federal 
courts around the country today.  It also explains how police have utilized stop-and-frisk 
practices before and after Terry, focusing in particular on the Giuliani-era theory of “hot-
spot policing.”  With these procedural and substantive backgrounds in mind, the article 
next turns to the Section 1983 stop-and-frisk litigation in the Southern District of New 
York.  It documents how, over the course of fourteen years, landmark stop-and-frisk 
cases have been repeatedly assigned to the same judge.   
The article then examines the grave consequences nonrandom case assignment 
has and will have in the Southern District’s stop-and-frisk litigation.  First, it contends 
that the related cases rule threatens the adversary system, allowing an interested judge to 
inject herself into the litigation as a player with a stake in the outcome.  Second, it 
contends that the appearance of impartiality created by nonrandom case assignment is 
reason alone to halt the practice.  Third, it argues that giving one district judge power 
over an entire category of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence elevates that judge’s 
decisions to a quasi-appellate level of significance within the Southern District itself, 
violating the principle that a district court opinion is not binding on any court within the 
same district.  The article proposes amendments to the Southern District’s local rules.  
The changes would make random case assignment the default procedure, and prohibit 
subject-matter specific manipulation of judges’ dockets.  It also advocates making all 
assignment decisions public and subject to challenge from the parties involved. 
Finally, the article concludes with a warning.  Delegating Fourth Amendment 




plaintiff-friendly rule at the District Court level, but may also increase the chances for 
appeal and eventual reversal at the Supreme Court, unintentionally broadening the very 
police practice the plaintiffs before Judge Scheindlin seek to narrow. 
II. RANDOM ASSIGNMENT OF CASES IS  VENERATED BUT 
UNENFORCEABLE, AND SUBJECT TO NUMEROUS EXCEPTIONS 
 
A. Random Assignment:  An Honored Practice Assumed To Be The 
Norm  
 
That fourteen-years-worth of significant stop-and-frisk cases have been assigned 
to Judge Scheindlin suggests that all federal cases are not assigned at random.  Yet the 
notion that a case filed in a federal district court is assigned at random to a district judge 
is pervasive.  Treatises and legal scholarship assume random assignment.
7
  There is even 
a stock description of how the process occurs:  after a case is filed, physical and literal 
wooden wheels, filled with index cards upon which the names of each district judge is 
printed, spin around and around, until the court clerk approaches the wheel and randomly 
draws a card, thus selecting the judge who will preside over the just-filed case.
8
   
Not only is random assignment assumed to be the status quo, is also a popular, 
venerated practice.  Southern District of New York Judge Denise Cote describes it as “a 
                                                        
7
 See, e.g., 2 N.Y.PRAC., COM. LITIG. IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS § 11:5 (3d ed. 2012) (New York 
“federal and state courts . . . use an ‘individual assignment system’ in which a judge is randomly assigned 
‘off the wheel’ upon the filing . . . of a complaint, or, in state court, of a request for judicial intervention.”); 
Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787, 812 (2012) 
(“Both circuit courts and district courts rely on random assignment to match cases with judges.”); Ahmed 
E. Taha, Judge Shopping:  Testing Whether Judges’ Political Orientations Affect Case Filings, 78 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1007, 1010 (2010) (“Judicial assignment is conducted randomly in federal district courts . . . .”); 
Richard Marcus, Still Confronting the Consolidation Conundrum, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 557, 
587 (2012) (“[T]he federal courts rely on a random assignment system . . . . .”).  Marcus is the Associate 
Reporter of the Judicial Conference of the United States’ Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. 
8
 Arnold H. Lubasch, Judge-Shopping in Federal Court:  Lawyers’ Quest for Leniency, N.Y. TIMES, March 
4, 1987, at B1; Goldstein, supra note 4 (“After an attempted police stop in 1999 led to the shooting of an 
unarmed Guinean immigrant named Amadou Diallo, a civil-rights group sued the New York Police 
Department . . . . [f]rom one of the wooden wheels used to assign cases in Federal District Court in 




beautiful thing” that makes her docket “rich and varied.”
9
  The Judicial Conference, a 
committee comprised of the chief judge of each circuit and a district judge from each 
circuit,
10
 has a “long-standing position” in favor of the random assignment of federal 
cases.
11
   
At least part of the reason why random assignment is widely assumed is that it is 
sensible.  In theory at least, the practice serves several important goals.  First—and most 
practically—it divvies up a district’s docket, assigning an equal number of cases to each 
judge.
12
  Second, it prevents any party from shopping for one judge over another.
13
  
Third, it prohibits any judge from lobbying for a particular case
14
—a good idea, as a 
judge who lobbies for a particular case may have a particular interest in a particular 
outcome.
15
  Fourth, random assignment is also favored by judges who want to remain 
generalists, rather than be forced to specialize in, for example, patent litigation.  A 
generalist docket permits the cross-fertilization of ideas; a judge may “look[] at cases 
                                                        
9
 Hon. Denise Cote, Making Experts Count, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 223, 223 (2011). 
10
 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.uscourts.gov/Federal 
Courts/JudicialConference.aspx (last visited July 9, 2013) (“The Conference of Senior Circuit Judges 
[renamed in 1948 as “the Judicial Conference of the United States] was created by Congress in 1922, to 
serve as the principal policy making body concerned with the administration of the U.S. Courts . . . . [T]he 
fundamental purpose of the Judicial Conference today is to make policy with regard to the administration 
of the U.S. courts.”).  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, MEMBERSHIP, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Membership.aspx (last visited July 9, 2013) 
(“The Chief Justice of the United States is the presiding officer of the Judicial Conference. Membership is 
comprised of the chief judge of each judicial circuit, the Chief Judge of the Court of International Trade, 
and a district judge from each regional judicial circuit.”). 
11
 Legislation Update:  Bills Focus on Security, Cameras and Patents, 39 THIRD BRANCH 4, 4 (Apr. 2007). 
12
 “The system is designed to have an equal number of cases assigned to each judge over a period of time.”  
Brooke Terpening, Practice Makes Perfect?  An Empirical Analysis of H.R. 5418, 4 FIU L. REV. 287, 315-
16 (2008); United States v. Mavroules, 798 F. Supp. 61, 61 (D. Mass. 1992) (“[B]lind, random draw 
selection process . . . prevents judge shopping by any party, thereby enhancing public confidence in the 
assignment process”).   
13
 Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue:  The Need for More Limits on Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 267, 292-93 (1996); Taha, supra note 8, at 1010 (as a result of random assignment, cases that result in 
outcomes that one party considers politically undesirable are the result of bad luck). 
14
 Theodore Meron, Judicial Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 359, 364 (2005). 
15
 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and The Rules of Procedure, 23 J. 




from one field and realize[] how an earlier decision in which [she] participated from a 
different field may suggest a creative answer to the problem.”
16
  
Legal and lay respect for random assignment is further confirmed by the rare 
instances when the practice was not honored—indeed, deviation from random assignment 
in high-profile cases can result in public outrage and congressional scrutiny.  In 1999, 
Judge Norma Holloway Johnson, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia, chose to assign criminal cases against so-called “presidential friends” Webster 
Hubbell and Charlie Trie to judges appointed by then-President Clinton, as opposed to 
having their cases randomly assigned.
17
  Hubbell was accused of tax evasion, whereas 
Charlie Trie was accused of violating campaign finance law.
18
   
Though local court rules permitted Judge Johnson to assign protracted cases like 
the Hubbell and Trie matters to specific judges she believed had enough bandwidth to 
handle them, Judge Johnson was aggressively criticized for her supposed “impartial 
administration of justice.”
19
 Orrin Hatch, then acting Senate Judiciary Chairman, asked 
Chief Justice Rehnquist to consider investigating why “two cases involving President 
Clinton's friends were assigned to Clinton-appointed judges.”
20
  Hatch also expressed 
concern that the incident “‘may have repercussions on the public's confidence in the 
impartial administration of justice by the federal courts.’”
21
   
The District of Columbia Circuit’s Judicial Council asked a committee of trial and 
appellate judges to investigate Judge Johnson’s actions; the committee hired a 
                                                        
16
 Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1767 (1997). 
17
 Pete Yost, Hubbell and Trie Cases Weren’t Randomly Assigned, PHILA. ENQUIR., Aug. 1, 1999 at A02. 
18
 Bill Miller, Judge Is Cleared of Impropriety; No Political Motive Found in Assignment of Sensitive 




 Janelle Carter, Hatch Asks for Probe of 2 Case Assignments, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Aug. 6, 
1999, at A4. 
21




Republican former U.S. attorney to conduct interviews and issue a report.
22
  His report 
concluded that there was no evidence of a partisan “‘plot or scheme.’”
23
  Nevertheless, 
following the investigation, the District of Columbia rescinded the rule that permitted 
nonrandom case assignment in protracted litigation, and ordered that random assignment 
be followed.
24
  In other words, even though no bias or wrongdoing was found, the mere 
appearance of impropriety and the arguable potential for bias was enough to scuttle the 
rule. 
Moreover, even after the rule change, the scrutiny of Judge Johnson’s actions 
persisted.  Judicial Watch, a conservative watchdog group particularly interested in the 
Clinton Administration and any individual associated with it, brought a complaint of 
judicial misconduct against Judge Johnson pursuant to the Judicial Council Reform and 
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,
25
 a statute designed to ensure that federal 
judges “will not ‘engage[ ] in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious 
administration of the business of the courts.’”
26
  The complaint alleged that Judge 
Johnson had departed from random assignment in criminal cases brought against “friends 
of the president,” steering them to judges appointed by Clinton so as to “tilt the cases in 
the administration's favor.”
27
  The Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Circuit, to 
whom the complaint was assigned, swiftly dismissed the allegation, explaining that local 
rules permitted nonrandom assignment of protracted cases in order to efficiently dispose 
of the court’s business.
28
  However, the Chief Judge did note that the local rule allowing 
                                                        
22






 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) (1994) (section (c)(1) repealed 2002).  
26
 In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 196 F.3d 1285, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
27






nonrandom assignment, and “the absence of ‘objective standards to govern the rule's 
use,’” made ‘both actual and perceived abuses’ possible.”
29
  
B. There Is No Right To Random Assignment 
 
Even though random assignment of newly-filed federal cases purportedly inspires 
public confidence in the judiciary, and deviation inspires public outrage, random 
assignment is not an enforceable right, even in the criminal context.
30
  Case assignment 
rules are dismissively referred to as “housekeeping” measures that vest litigants with no 
rights.
31
  The only relevant case assignment statute provides district courts with the power 
to write their own case assignment rules, described as “the business of a court.”
32
  The 
district court’s chief judge is responsible for ensuring that such rules are observed,
33
 and 
because the district court is making and applying its own rules, parties have no 
mechanism to require the district court to assign cases randomly.   
There is, however, a limited (and illustrative) exception:  in the rare event that 
district judges cannot agree upon the adoption of case assignment rules, the governing 
circuit court intervenes and implements its own case assignment rules.
34
  In this rare case, 
the district court itself is subject to rules from a supervening body (the circuit court), and 
if those rules require random assignment, this provides a litigant with a mechanism to 
demand random case assignment.  This was the case in Utah-Idaho Sugar Company v. 
                                                        
29
 Id. at 332. 
30
 Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Milwaukee v. Wis., 102 F.R.D. 596, 598 (D. Wis. 1984) (“The assignment of cases 
does not give or deny any litigant any due process rights.”); United States v. Keane, 375 F. Supp. 1201, 
1204 (D. Ill. 1974) (criminal defendants have no due process right to the manner in which their cases are 
assigned). 
31
 J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges At The Court Of Appeals, 78 
TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1096 (2000). 
32










 in which a plaintiff succeeded in challenging the Chief Judge of the District of 
Utah’s decision to assign the plaintiff’s case to himself, instead at random.   
In 1972, when Utah-Idaho Sugar reached the Tenth Circuit, the Utah District’s 
“business of the court” had been supervised by the Circuit for nearly fifteen years; during 
that stretch of time, the judges sitting within the District of Utah could not agree upon 
case assignment rules.
36
  The rules put in place by the Circuit “requir[ed] an equal and 
random division of civil cases” which “balanced and apportioned the criminal, 
bankruptcy, immigration and naturalization cases.”
37
   
In 1971, the Chief Judge of the District of Utah empowered himself to overrule 
the Circuit’s assignment procedures, assigning himself the power to distribute cases as he 
saw fit.
38
  In so doing, he chose certain cases for himself, and assigned others.
39
  The 
plaintiff’s case was one he kept. 
Although the judge’s methods did not comply with the Circuit’s rule of random 
assignment, this alone did not invalidate his actions.  Because the District of Utah had 
only two judges, the Chief Judge and a non-Chief district judge, and these judges did not 
agree on the Chief Judge’s procedures, the Circuit’s rules controlled.
40
  The Circuit’s 
rules happened, by chance, to provide for random case assignment.  If the two District of 
Utah judges had agreed that the Chief Judge had discretion to hold on to certain cases and 
assign out others, that rule would have controlled.   
                                                        
35
 461 F.2d 1100, 1101-02 (10th Cir. 1972). 
36
 Id.  
37
 Id. at 1102. 
38
 Id.  
39
 Id. at 1104. 
40




As Utah-Idaho Sugar confirms, any perceived right to random assignment is 
illusory.  District courts have broad discretion to assign cases as they see fit, and there is 
no mechanism for parties to challenge those decisions.  Moreover, in the specific 
example of the Southern District of New York, as described below, not only is any 
“right” illusory, the many exceptions to random assignment permit judges to avoid entire 
categories of cases they do not wish to hear, and to actively seek out the ones they want. 
C. The Southern District Of New York’s Case Assignment Rules Permit 
Judges To Choose Cases Based On The Cases’ Subject Matter 
 
The Southern District of New York’s Rules for the Division of Business Among 
District Judges—which govern how cases are assigned after they are filed— appear to 
mandate random assignment, stating that “[e]ach civil and criminal action and 
proceeding, except as otherwise provided, shall be assigned by lot to one judge for all 
purposes,”
41
 and further providing that “all active judges, except the chief judge, shall be 
assigned substantially an equal share of the categories of cases of the court over a period 
of time.”
42
  This is the default rule in district courts across the country, from the Eastern 
District of New York
43
 to the Central District of California.
44
  Yet a close examination of 
the Southern District of New York’s rules reveals that random assignment can be easily 
overcome in practice.   
1. Case Assignment In The Southern District Is Overseen By 
A Committee, And Makes No Use Of A “Wheel”  
 
                                                        
41
 DIVISION OF BUSINESS RULE 1 (emphasis added).  
42
 Id.  
43
 LOCAL RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS FOR THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN DISTRICTS OF 
NEW YORK, GUIDELINES FOR THE DIVISION OF BUSINESS AMONG DISTRICT JUDGES, EASTERN DISTRICT, 
RULE 50.2(b). 
44




Though each Southern District case is purportedly assigned “by lot,” the “by lot” 
system is administered by an assignment committee, consisting of the district’s chief 
judge and two other district judges.
45
  The assignment committee rules upon “all issues 
relating to assignments.”
46
  The assignment committee’s membership and its decision-
making processes are not made public.  When a case is assigned to a district judge by the 
assignment committee, even the district judge to whom the case is assigned remains in 
the dark as to why he received the case.
47
  
The assignment committee also assigns cases by nonrandom procedures in 
circumstances not contemplated by the local rules.  For example, the rules are silent as to 
how assignment of cases transferred from other districts into the Southern District should 
be handled.  In 2010, Southern District of New York Chief Judge Preska selected the 
judge to whom 15 shareholder actions against Bank of America should be reassigned 
after Southern District Judge Chin, who was presiding over the cases, was appointed to 
the Second Circuit.
48
  Bank of America was before Southern District Judge Rakoff on 
another matter at the time (brought by the SEC), and wrote Judge Chin, on the record, 
asking that the cases on his docket be reassigned by lot rather than to Judge Rakoff.
49
  
Following submission of that letter, Judge Preska assigned the cases to another judge in 
the District, Judge Castel.  Preska insisted that Bank of America’s letter to Judge Chin 
had no influence over her decision, but rather were assigned to the judge of her choosing 
                                                        
45
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46
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47
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although “the assignment committee rules upon matters relating to assignments in accordance with these 
rules . . . [t]he considerations that led to this assignment are not known”).   
48
 J. Robert Brown, Jr., Non-Random Assignment of Federal Cases and Bank of America, RACE TO THE 
BOTTOM, May 20, 2010, available at http://www.theracetothebottom.org/miscellaneous/non-random-






because the cases were originally transferred into the Southern District from other 
districts.
 50
   
2. Certain Cases Are Expressly Exempt From Random 
Assignment 
 
Second, certain categories of civil actions and proceedings are exempt from 
random assignment.  Applications for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) are 
expressly exempt from assignment by lot,
51
 though no corresponding rule addresses the 
manner in which the applications are actually assigned.
52
  Similarly, the assignment 
committee may certify a case as one requiring “extraordinary priority or a prompt trial or 
other disposition,” and allow the initially-assigned judge to decline the case.
53
   
3. Senior Judges And Visiting Judges Can Avoid Entire 
Categories Of Cases  
 
Third, certain judges are permitted to select the number and category of cases they 
are willing to take.  Perhaps the most important of these are the senior judges, who handle 
15% of all cases in the federal courts.
 54
  Senior judges may request that they only receive 
new cases in limited subject matters, and may directly select the subject matter of the 
cases they are willing to accept on transfer from other districts.
55
  Senior judges also have 
considerable discretion over their existing docket, and may furnish the assignment 
committee with a list of cases they want transferred off their respective dockets.
56
     




 DIVISION OF BUSINESS RULE 4(b).  
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Another significant category is visiting judges.  A visiting judge assigned to the 
Southern District must advise the assignment committee of the number and category of 
pending cases he wishes to accept.
57
  This is a somewhat puzzling rule, since, by statute, 
visiting judges may only be assigned to service in a district court in another circuit “upon 
presentation of a certificate of necessity by the chief judge or circuit justice of the circuit 
wherein the need arises.”
58
  One might expect that a district’s certified necessity would 
arise with respect to specific cases and that the visiting judge would be expected to help 
relieve that burden, rather than dictate what types and number of cases he would be 
willing to hear. 
4. Patent Cases Can Be Rejected Following Initial Random 
Assignment, And Then Assigned To Specific Judges Willing 
To Preside Over Patent Cases 
 
Perhaps the best-known exception to random assignment is patent cases.  A Patent 
Pilot Program inaugurated in November 2011 allows certain judges in the Southern 
District (and thirteen other “pilot” courts) who are randomly assigned patent cases to, 
thirty days after filing, decline the case and have it assigned by lot to one of ten district 
judges participating in the program.
59
  Cases are then re-assigned to judges who requested 
to be designated as pilot patent judges.
60
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5. Judges Can Handpick Cases For Their Docket After The 
Cases Are Filed 
 
The most permissive rules governing nonrandom assignment allow “any judge, 
upon written advice to the assignment committee” to transfer any case, or any part of a 
case, “to any consenting judge” unless the transfer is due to disqualification or the fact 
that a judge “has presided over a mistrial or former trial of the same case,” in which case 
assignment by lot controls.
61
  This rule permits the consenting judge to agree to take a 
specific case onto his docket.  Indeed, it permits the consenting judge to seek out such 
cases by asking a judge whether he is willing to give away the cases in question. 
The transfer of related cases rules also allow a judge to preselect a case.  An 
attorney filing a case that may be related to a previously-filed case must designate that 
case as related on a form that is served with the complaint.
62
  A case that is so designated 
is then “forwarded to the judge before whom the earlier-filed case is then pending.”
63
  In 
determining relatedness, a judge may consider whether: 
(i) A substantial saving of judicial resources would result; or 
(ii) The just efficient and economical conduct of the litigations would 
be advanced; or 
(iii) The convenience of the parties or witnesses would be served.64 
 
However, these three criteria are not intended to limit the factors considered in 
determining relatedness; a judge may also take into account “a congruence of parties or 
witnesses or the likelihood of a consolidated or joint trial or joint pre-trial discovery.”
65
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Despite the criteria governing relatedness, the judge to whom the potentially 
related case is forwarded “has the sole discretion to accept or reject the case.”
66
  Indeed, 
Rule 13, the “Transfer of Related Cases” rule, cross-references Rule 14, which permits 
transfer of cases by consent, stating that “[n]othing in [Rule 13] limits the use of Rule 14 
for reassignment of all or part of any case from the docket of one judge to that of another 
by agreement of the respective judges.
67
  Combined, these two rules permit judges to 
transfer cases to each other, whether the case being transferred is related to one already 
existing on the transferee judge’s docket, or not.
68
   
The remainder of this article addresses the practical application and substantive 
consequences of the last of these categories—the “related cases” rule—in one category of 
case (so-called “stop-and-frisk” litigation) in one court (the Southern District of New 
York). 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF STOP-AND FRISK LITIGATION:  FROM 
TERRY V. OHIO TO MODERN CHALLENGES TO NEW YORK CITY 
POLICING 
 
A. Terry v. Ohio Holds that Stop-and-Frisk Policing Practices Are 
Constitutional Even In The Absence Of Probable Cause 
 
Over thirty years before Daniels v. City of New York was filed in the Southern 
District of New York, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Fourth Amendment 
requires that police officers have probable cause to stop, question and frisk people they 
encounter on the street.
69
  Terry is often viewed as having legitimized and opened the 
door to more intrusive police practices—though, of course, Terry addressed police 
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 Similar rules apply to motions for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and motions for the return of 
property seized in a criminal case.  RULE 9(a).  Though these categories of motions also raise the case 
assignment manipulation issues addressed in this article, they are themselves beyond its scope.  
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practices that were already in force.  In the decades preceding Terry v. Ohio, police 
officers across the country routinely stopped, questioned and frisked individuals without 
probable cause or arrest warrants.
70
  The practice was commonplace, and Terry is better 
understood as having legitimized that status quo.
71
   
Terry examined the observations made by Detective Martin McFadden on the 
streets of downtown Cleveland. McFadden noticed Richard Chilton and John Terry 
behaving “suspiciously” and believed that they were casing out a business to later rob it; 
these observations led him to stop and search the two men.  McFadden found a gun on 
both, and arrested them.
72
  In a pretrial motion, Terry and Chilton argued that the frisk 
performed by McFadden was an arrest without probable cause, and, therefore, the 
evidence recovered should be suppressed.
73




The Terry Court acknowledged that it faced “serious questions concerning the 
role of the Fourth Amendment in the confrontation on the street between the citizen and 
the policeman investigating suspicious circumstances.”
75
  It also noted that it was 
scrutinizing a “sensitive area” of police conduct, and carefully weighed the dueling 
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74
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interests—the “dangerous situations on city streets” versus the “intrusion[s] upon 
protected personal security.”
76
  The Court foreshadowed the nature of future litigation, 
acknowledging the argument that stop-and-frisk tactics “exacerbate police-community 
tensions in the crowded centers of our Nation's cities.”
77
  In the end, the balance tipped in 
favor of perceived policing needs.  Following Terry, an individual suspected of criminal 




B. The Aftermath Of Terry’s Conspicuous Silence Regarding Race-Based 
Motives For Police Stops  
 
Terry and Chilton were African-American, and Detective McFadden, white.  
These facts were explicit during the Terry oral argument, but absent from the Court’s 
opinion,
79
 which is conspicuously silent on the question of whether McFadden had race-
based reasons for his suspicions.
80  Terry did pause to acknowledge that “certain elements 
of the police community” had engaged in “[t]he wholesale harassment” of minority 
groups.
81
  Still, according to the Court, the harassment “[would] not be stopped by the 
exclusion of any evidence from any criminal trial.”
82 
Terry’s critics argue that requiring probable cause to stop-and-frisk might have 
halted the police practice of using race-specific reasons to choose whom to stop and 
frisk.
83
  Indeed, Terry’s silence as to race-based suspicion arguably opened the door to 
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future Fourth Amendment jurisprudence permitting the consideration of race in Terry 
stops, as well as in more intrusive seizures.
84
  There remains no Fourth Amendment 
exclusion remedy for searches and seizures based solely on race.
85
  Moreover, the 
police’s perceived authority to rely on “race-dependent criteria” has only served to 
increase feelings of “racial grievance” against law enforcement.
86
   
C. Policing Post-Terry:  New York City’s Targeting Of Crime “Hot 
Spots” And The Perception That Stop-and-Frisk Is Racial Profiling  
 
According to former New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton, 
“[s]top, question and frisk” is a practice that has been around “forever.”
87
  It is “a basic 
tool,” “the most fundamental practice in American policing.”
88
  “It is done every day, 
probably by every city force in America.”
89
 
Bratton served as NYPD commissioner from 1994 through 1996, reporting to 
New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani.  Under Bratton, the NYPD “began to make extensive 
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use of data to identify crime-prone areas and focus resources on them.”
90
  Bratton, who 
currently serves as the Los Angeles Police Department’s commissioner, led the 
development of CompStat, a computerized crime mapping system.
91
  According to its 
fans, “CompStat revolutionized policing, enabling officers to focus their efforts in 
problem areas, armed with real-time information, accurate intelligence, rapid deployment 
of resources, individual accountability, and relentless follow-up.”
92
   
Bratton’s “hot-spot policing” targeted low-level crimes, such as non-violent 
property offenses, which were “more prevalent in urban neighborhoods with elevated 
rates of poverty and social fragmentation.”
93
  This practice also identified and targeted 
areas inhabited overwhelming by people of color, and, as one critic has suggested, 
“serve[d] to justify indiscriminate policing of th[e] targeted population.”
94
  Because 
minority neighborhoods were disproportionately targeted under hot-spot policing, also 
termed “‘order-maintenance policing,’” such policies have become synonymous with 
“racial policing” or “racial profiling.”
95
   
Yet pursuant to Terry, a stop-and-frisk is not per se unconstitutional.  Still, New 
York City’s own comptroller has referred to the NYPD’s use of the practice as “the 
biggest form of systemic racial profiling we have anywhere in the United States of 
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For current NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly, stop-and-frisk is a “critical—and 
constitutional” part of the transformation of New York City over the past two decades, 
during which “the annual number of murders has fallen more than 80%.”
98
  In 
implementing stop-and-frisk, the NYPD places it officers “right in the middle of where 
the problems are” which Kelly describes as “mostly minority areas.”
99
  Kelly fears that 
eliminating stop-and-frisk would embolden criminals, who would no longer fear being 
stopped and would also start carrying and using guns more frequently.
 100
 
IV. HOW LANDMARK SECTION 1983 STOP-AND-FRISK LIGITATION 
FOUND ITS WAY TO JUDGE SCHEINDLIN, AND NEVER LEFT  
 
A. Judge Scheindlin Is Randomly Assigned The Landmark Daniels v. 
City of New York Class Action 
 
In 1999, Judge Scheindlin was randomly assigned Daniels v. The City of 
New York, a case filed by the non-profit Center for Constitutional Rights.
101
  The civil 
suit, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”),
102
 alleged that the NYPD’s 
stop-and-frisk practices violated the Fourth Amendment,
103
 and also sought to disband 
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 99-cv-1695-SAS (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1999). 
102
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the NYPD’s Street Crime Unit (“SCU”).
104
  The Daniels complaint alleged that “in high 
crime areas, SCU officers have been repeatedly conducting stops and frisks of individuals 
without the reasonable articulable suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment.”
105
  The 
case was spurred in part by the February 1999 death of unarmed Amadou Diallo, who 
was shot by four SCU officers,
106
 as well as by the release of statistics which, according 
to Daniels, demonstrated that the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk encounters disproportionately 
targeted Black and Latino men.
107
   
The filing of Daniels also coincided with widespread public frustration.  Police 
departments across the country were accused of engaging in rampant racial profiling and 
of detaining individuals with much less than “reasonable suspicion,” the standard 
required to initiate a Terry stop.
108
  In addition to Daniels, lawsuits alleging racial 
profiling were brought in Los Angeles, New Jersey, Philadelphia, and Hobbs, New 
Mexico,
109
 both by the Department of Justice and by independent civil rights groups.
110
   
Daniels was the first lawsuit to bring the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk practices “under 
fire.”
111
  The plaintiffs were successful in winning class certification
112
 and in negotiating 
a sweeping settlement, which required the NYPD to create a written policy regarding 
racial profiling compliant with the United States and New York Constitutions, to train 
                                                        
104
 Center for Constitutional Rights, Daniels, et al., v. the City of New York, supra note 103; Goldstein, 
supra note 4. 
105
 Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Rather, SCU officers have 
improperly used racial profiling, not reasonable suspicion, as the basis for the stops and frisks.”).   
106
 Noah Kupferberg, Transparency:  A New role for Police Consent Decrees, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 




 Id. at 130. 
109
 Id. at 134-140 (discussing New Jersey and Los Angeles lawsuits); Heidi Boghosian, Applying Restraints 
to Private Police, 70 MO. L. REV. 177, 214-15 (2005) (discussing Philadelphia and New Mexico lawsuits). 
110
 Kupferberg, supra note 106, at 131.   
111
 Southern District of New York Certifies Class Action Against City Police for Suspicionless Stops and 
Frisks of Blacks and Latinos, 126 HARV. L. REV. 826, 827 (2013). 
112
 STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT, DANIELS V. CITY OF NEW YORK, available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/ 




officers regarding the same, and to ensure compliance with the policy.
113
  The named 
plaintiffs were awarded damages totaling $167,500,
114
 and their counsel received over 
$3.5 million in costs and fees.
115
   
Unusually—and crucially for future litigation—the settlement also required police 
to complete a written form each time they conducted a stop-and-frisk (known as “UF-250 
Reports”),
116
 and to provide plaintiffs’ counsel with quarterly data regarding the same 
“on a quarterly basis from the last quarter of 2003 through the first quarter of 2007.”
117
  
Judge Scheindlin retained jurisdiction over the case and oversaw implementation of the 
settlement.   
The parties in Daniels returned to Judge Scheindlin’s courtroom in 2007.  The 
plaintiffs accused the NYPD of a “surge” in the very kind of illegal stops at issue in their 
original complaint.
118
  Instead of reopening Daniels, Judge Scheindlin suggested another 
approach.
119
  “‘If you got [sic] proof of inappropriate racial profiling in a good 
constitutional case, why don’t you bring a lawsuit?’” the judge asked.
120
  “You can 
certainly mark it as related,”
121
 she added.   
B. Subsequent Landmark Stop-And-Frisk Cases Are Assigned To Judge 
Scheindlin  
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On January 31, 2008, the Center for Constitutional Rights and an attorney named 
Jonathan Moore, both of whom served as plaintiffs’ counsel in Daniels, brought Floyd v. 
City of New York.  Like Daniels, Floyd was brought pursuant to Section 1983, and 
alleged that the NYPD engaged in stop-and-frisk practices that violated the Fourth 
Amendment.
122
  Like Daniels, Floyd is a landmark case.
123
  Judge Scheindlin described it 
as one of “great public concern,” so grave that “twenty-seven of the fifty-one members of 
the New York City Council” filed an amicus brief arguing that the practices create “‘a 
growing distrust of the NYPD on the part of Black and Latino residents.’”
124
   
The Floyd plaintiffs also won class certification.  The class was broadly-defined, 
consisting of:  
All persons who since January 31, 2005 have been, or in 
the future will be, subjected to the New York Police 
Department's policies and/or widespread customs or 
practices of stopping, or stopping and frisking, persons in 
the absence of a reasonable, articulable suspicion . . . 
persons stopped or stopped and frisked on the basis of 
being Black or Latino in violation of the Equal Protection 




Its forward-looking definition of the class members as including all person who “in the 
future will be [] subjected to the [NYPD’s policies . . . of . . . stopping and frisking[] 
persons” without reasonable suspicion is so broad that it potentially includes any resident 
of New York City. 
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The Floyd lawsuit benefitted from the terms of the Daniels settlement, and in 
particular its requirements that the police complete a written form each time they 
conducted a stop-and-frisk, and that the City of New York provide data regarding the 
forms to plaintiffs’ counsel.
126
  The data was “indispensable” evidence for the Floyd 
plaintiffs’ counsel; in fact, Floyd’s filing was prompted by an analysis of the data, which 
allegedly revealed that “the NYPD has continued to engage in suspicion-less and racially 
pretextual stop-and-frisks.”
 127
   
On the same date Floyd was filed, a docket entry unattributed to either plaintiffs 
or defendants noted that Floyd had been referred to Judge Scheindlin as “possibly 
related” to Daniels.
128
  On February 15, 2008, a “Notice of Assignment” officially sent 
Floyd to Judge Scheindlin.
129
  The Notice stated that the case was assigned pursuant to 
“the memorandum of the Case Processing Assistant,”
130
 which was not attached and is 
not available on the docket.   
The Southern District’s rules regarding related cases do not contemplate any role 
for a case processing assistant.  Rather, any civil action, once filed in the Southern 
District, is to be “assigned by lot . . . to a district judge for all purposes.”
131
  That is, it is 
not automatically referred to the judge who may have a related case.  According to the 
rules, after being randomly assigned, a related case may then be transferred to the judge 
presiding over an earlier-filed related case after a party designates it as potentially related 
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  Next, the judge with the earlier-filed case decides whether to accept 
or reject the transferred case.
133
   
Though the Floyd complaint referenced Daniels several times,
134
 it did not 
designate Floyd as related to Daniels, even though the Southern District’s local rules 
impose a duty on “each attorney appearing in any civil or criminal case to bring promptly 
to the attention of the Court all facts which said attorney believes are relevant to a 
determination that said case and one or more pending civil or criminal cases should be 
heard by the same Judge.”
 135
  Though Judge Scheindlin accepted Floyd as a case related 
to Daniels, she did so according to a procedure not contemplated by the local rules.   
On January 28, 2010, Davis v. City of New York,
136
 a case challenging the 
NYPD’s “vertical patrols” in New York public housing on the grounds that certain 
detentions made during those patrols lacked reasonable suspicion,
137
 was also referred to 
Judge Scheindlin on the date it was filed.  It was accepted as related to Floyd several days 
later.
138
   
Davis is also an important case.  According to Judge Scheindlin, it implicates 
“[t]he long line of cases concerning the power of the police to stop and frisk,” and 
“illustrates the tensions between liberty and security in particularly stark form, because it 
deals with police practices in and around the home, where the interests in both liberty and 
                                                        
132
 DIVISION OF BUSINESS RULE 4(b). 
133
 Id. at RULE 13(c)(i),(ii). 
134
 08-cv-01034-SAS-HBP Dock. No. 1 at ¶¶ 26, 46 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2008).   
135
 The Southern District’s local rules impose a “continuing duty of each attorney appearing in any civil or 
criminal case to bring promptly to the attention of the Court all facts which said attorney believes are 
relevant to a determination that said case and one or more pending civil or criminal cases should be heard 
by the same Judge, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of judicial effort.” S.D.N.Y. L. CIV. R. 1.6(A). 
136
 10-cv-00699-SAS (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010). 
137
 10-cv-00699-SAS, Dock. No. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010). 
138




security are especially strong.”
139
  In denying the City of New York’s partial motion for 
summary judgment as to the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims, Scheindlin cited the 
testimony of the president of a New York City public housing resident group, who 
compared New York Public housing to a “penal colony” supervised by the NYPD.
140
  
On March 28, 2012, Ligon v. City of New York, a class action case challenging the 
NYPD’s trespass arrest policy, or “Operation Clean Halls,” through which NYPD 
officers patrol private housing across New York City,
141
 was referred to Scheindlin as 
potentially related to Davis, and soon after accepted as a related case.
142
   
In January 2013, Judge Scheindlin granted the Ligon plaintiffs a preliminary 
injunction, finding sufficient evidence that certain trespass arrests violated the Fourth 
Amendment.
143
  Ligon, like Daniels, Davis and Floyd, also raised significant legal issues.  
In her injunction ruling, Scheindlin waxed philosophical: 
For those of us who do not fear being stopped as we 
approach or leave our own homes or those of our friends 
and families, it is difficult to believe that residents of one of 
our boroughs live under such a threat.  In light of the 
evidence presented . . . however, I am compelled to 
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Scheindlin postponed imposing any remedy in Ligon, instead choosing to 
consolidate the remedies hearing in Ligon with the remedies hearing in Floyd.
145
  At the 
time, the liability portion of the Floyd trial—in fact any portion of the Floyd trial—had 
yet to commence. 
On August 12, 2013, following a three-month bench trial in Floyd, Judge 
Scheindlin entered a 198-page “Opinion and Order.”  She granted a sweeping injunction 
against the NYPD (a) ordering changes to NYPD policies and activities, (b) appointing a 
monitor to oversee stop-and-frisk practices, (c) requiring a “community-based joint 
remedial process to be conducted by a court-appointed facilitator,” and, most remarkably, 
(d) ordering that one precinct in each of New York City’s boroughs place body-worn 
cameras on their police officers.
146
  The ruling received widespread national, and even 
international, press coverage.
147
   
C. Scheindlin’s Control Over Stop-and-Frisk Litigation Garners Press 
Attention And Disparate Reactions From Those Involved In The 
Litigation 
 
The New York Times noticed the case assignment pattern described above, and 
reported that “new stop-and-frisk lawsuits are routed directly to Judge Scheindlin” 
because “civil rights groups, sometimes at the judge’s suggestion, have designated the 
subsequent cases as ‘related’ to similar cases,” ever since Daniels was filed.
148
  The paper 
noted that Judge Scheindlin’s has effectively acquired “near exclusive jurisdiction” over 
stop-and-frisk practices.
149
  According to The New Yorker, ever since Daniels, when civil 
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rights groups challenged the stop-and-frisk policies of the N.Y.P.D., they “have made 
sure that the cases went before Judge Scheindlin.”
150
   
Christopher Dunn, attorney for the Ligon plaintiffs, told the Times that “[i]t would 
make no sense to have different judges handle the three stop-and-frisk cases.”
151
  “These 
are precisely the types of cases to have before a single judge,” he added.
152
  Jonathan 
Moore, co-counsel for the plaintiffs in Daniels, in which his firm won approximately 
$925,000 in costs and fees,
153
 is also one of the plaintiffs’ counsel in Floyd.  During the 




The City of New York has tried to convince Judge Scheindlin to send stop-and-
frisk cases back to the clerk for random assignment.
155
  NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly 
believes that the judge “is very much in [the plaintiffs’] corner and has been all along 
throughout her career.”
156
   
Judge Scheindlin has acknowledged that “‘some judges are less inclined to accept 
a case as related, [and] some judges are more inclined to accept it as related,”
157
 but 
declined to characterize herself as a judge more included to accept related cases.  
Nevertheless, the facts remain what they are—following random assignment of Daniels, 
Judge Scheindlin has presided over every single significant stop-and-frisk case in the 
Southern District.  Some of this has been by operation of the “related cases” rule, and 
some apparently outside of it, but all of it has been expressly encouraged by the Judge 
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herself and by a group of plaintiffs’ counsel, some of whom have made millions from 
these cases. 
V. NONRANDOM CASE ASSIGNMENT FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERS 
THE ROLE OF A DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
 
A. Judicial Integrity Requires Neutral Case-Assignment Rules With No 
Role For Judicial Self-Selection Of Cases 
 
“[J]udges are human and bring a basket of biases to the bench.”
158
  As a result, 
“the particular judge assigned to a case . . . can be outcome determinative.”
159
  When 
judges can pick cases, including through the unlimited possibilities offered by the 
Southern District of New York’s transfer and related cases rules, they may gain access to 
cases to affect the cases’ outcomes for any number of reasons.
160
  “Some may do so for 
jurisprudential reasons or out of perceived expertise,” while others may believe that the 
law has been misapplied and wish to correct a mistake.
161
  “They may seek [a case 
assignment] to promote a judicial philosophy or set of moral principles,” or for very 
human reasons, such as a desire for notoriety.
162
  To protect against the influence of a 
judge’s bias, a judge must play no role in the case assignment process.
163
  Maintaining 
judicial integrity requires neutral assignment of cases.
164
  Drawing an unfavorable judge 
is fair when it is a matter of luck, and nothing more.
165
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When neutrality is abandoned, the possibility that assignments were made in an 
effort to influence a case’s outcome becomes very real.
166
  Indeed, there is at least one 
instance of documented, deliberate, results-oriented case assignment in the federal court 
system.  In the 1960s, panels in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals hearing civil rights 
cases where purposefully stacked with pro-civil rights majorities to ensure pro-civil rights 
outcomes.
167
  In the Fall of 1963, the Fifth Circuit was divided, with four members 
consistently voting in favor of civil rights plaintiffs and desegregation, and other 
members stubbornly refusing to extend the Fourteenth Amendment in civil rights 
cases.
168
  The Circuit’s assigning judge steered certain cases he euphemistically deemed 
“touchy” to weeks in which certain judges, in particular, those who did not favor civil 
rights extensions, would be unable to participate.
169
 
The judge who steered civil rights cases to panels more likely to enforce 
desegregation had an honorable, and morally just, end game.  Yet the method was 
unjustifiable, and especially risky given the controversial nature of the subject matter.  
Judges who side with the rights of minorities, but do so by skirting the system, risk 
jeopardizing any advances they make for the groups they seek to protect by introducing 
bias into the judicial system.   
In the Fifth Circuit cases, questionable means were put to unquestionably just 
ends, but if court packing can happen in a case that results in a morally acceptable 
outcome (desegregation), the opposite is also true.  If the Fifth Circuit’s assigning judge 
had been a segregationist, he just as easily could have shifted these “touchy” cases 
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toward the segregationist members of the court, rather than away from them.  Nonrandom 
assignment of cases could permit a wrong-minded judge to affect a case’s outcome.   
Nonrandom assignment also has implications for the adversary system.  Although 
party representation is “basic to our system of adjudication,”
170
 when a judge chooses a 
case based on its subject matter, the judge steps out of his classic role as neutral 
adjudicator of the issues.  This, like a judge who raises a point sua sponte when it is not 
argued by the parties, risks converting the federal system, one whose hallmarks is its 
adversary nature, into one that looks more like an inquisitorial one.
171
  When a judge 
picks a case for his own reasons, he starts to look less like a judge and more like someone 
with a stake in the litigation.   
The Southern District’s permissive related cases rule permits a judge to make a 
preliminary finding about two cases’ facts, and, before the later-filed case has even 
begun, make conclusions based on the later-filed complaint’s unproven factual 
allegations.  This effectively allows a plaintiff to plead his way to a particular judge, 
regardless of the actual facts.  For example, Ligon v. City of New York, filed on March 28, 
2012, addressed the NYPD’s trespass arrest policy, through which NYPD officers patrol 
private housing across New York City.  On April 3, 2012, Judge Scheindlin accepted 
Ligon on the grounds that it was related to Davis v. City of New York, filed in 2010.
172
  
By the time Ligon was filed, the Davis litigation had been through several rounds of 
heated discovery motions, and the parties’ substantial differences were well-known.   
                                                        
170
 Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 413 (2000); William R. Casto, Advising Presidents:  Robert 
Jackson and the Destroyers-For-Bases Deal, 52 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 130 (2012) (“The hallmark of an 
adversary system is two advocates pitted against each other in attempts to persuade a neutral judge.”).   
171
 Cf. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
172




None of this was true in Ligon.  The plaintiffs were different, the individual 
defendants were different—indeed, the only common defendant was the City of New 
York, an institutional defendant sued multiple times virtually every day—and the policies 
were different—public versus private housing.  There was no real basis to deem these 
cases related.  The thread connecting Ligon to Daniels is even thinner:  Daniels has 
nothing to do with housing, either public or private. 
In a pure adversarial system “[t]he trier of fact . . . does not independently 
investigate the facts, but instead remains neutral so as to avoid reaching a premature 
decision.  Judges rely on the parties to frame the dispute and to present evidence as they 
see fit.”
173
  When a judge plays a role in the case assignment process (to determine 
relatedness) by comparing the facts alleged in a later-filed case to those established in an 
earlier-filed, and more developed matter, the judge is acting less like a neutral arbiter and 
more like an interested investigator in the civil law mode (or even like a grand jury in a 
criminal case).    
B. Judge Scheindlin’s Appearance Of Bias Is Reason Alone To 
Randomly Assign Stop-And-Frisk Cases  
 
1. Judge Scheindlin Has Evidenced An Appearance Of 
Anti-Police Bias 
 
Judge Scheindlin’s involvement in high-profile stop-and-frisk decisions, and her 
history of ruling against the NYPD, can be traced back to a case that appeared on her 
docket during the Bratton era.  In 1995, Antonio Fernandez, known as “King Tone,” 
leader of the Latin Kings, a notorious drug gang targeted by the United States Attorney’s 
office for the Southern District of New York, was arrested by an NYPD officer following 
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a stop-and-frisk that revealed a small amount of marijuana on his person.
174
  According to 
the arresting officer, as he approached Fernandez, “he smelled marijuana.”
175
  He then 
frisked Fernandez along his waistband, the outside of his jacket, and down his pants leg; 
when he passed over the pants’ pocket, the officer heard a crinkling sound.  He then 
recovered a small amount of marijuana from Fernandez’s pocket.
176
  Fernandez was 
taken to a police precinct, and frisked again, at which point a loaded .38 caliber revolver 
was found in his pants.
177
   
Officers arrived on the scene of Fernandez’s arrest after receiving a radio run 
directing them to investigate a 911 call reporting a Latin Kings meeting in a Bronx park.  
“An anonymous caller had reported that at least one of the gang members was armed 
with a gun;” the armed individual was described as “a male Hispanic wearing a white 
jacket with black stripes.”
178
  Fernandez was wearing a jacket “similar” to the one 
described in the 911 call.
179
 
The case was (randomly) assigned to Judge Scheindlin, who found that the 
officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Fernandez, due in part to the paucity of 
details provided by the anonymous caller, and the fact that Fernandez’s jacket did not 
exactly match the description provided by the caller.
180
  As a result, Fernandez’s initial 
detention was held unconstitutional, and all evidence obtained pursuant to the stop was 
suppressed.
181
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Scheindlin also criticized the manner in which the revolver was discovered, 
stating that “[i]t is extremely difficult to believe that the [officer who located the 
marijuana in Fernandez’s pant pocket] could have missed a bulky .38 caliber revolver 
hidden in Defendant’s pants.”
182
  No reason was provided for the judge’s belief that the 
officer’s testimony was “extremely difficult” to believe.  Indeed, that a gun may be found 
during a stationhouse frisk, but not at the scene of an arrest, is imminently plausible.  An 
initial stop-and-frisk, made hastily and in public, where police are vulnerable to attacks 
from those who resent their mere presence, let alone their decision to make an arrest, is 
likely swift and not as thorough a search that occurs in the controlled environment of a 
precinct.  Moreover, it may not be too surprising if the leader of a notorious gang were 
skilled in hiding weapons. 
The ruling in the Fernandez case “set a template for [Judge Scheindlin’s] handling 
of criminal cases.”
 183 
 A 2013 report commissioned by New York City Mayor 
Bloomberg’s office concluded that Scheindlin is “biased against law enforcement” 
because “she issues an unusually high number of written opinions finding that the NYPD 
and other law enforcement agencies make illegal searches and seizures.”
184
 “Scheindlin 
came down against law enforcement in 60% of her written ‘search-and-seizure’ opinions 
dating to when she started on the bench in 1994 . . . the highest rate of any of the 16 
current and former Manhattan federal judges the study looked at since 1990.
 185
  One of 
Scheindlin’s law clerks has reported that Scheindlin “thinks cops lie.”
186
  “In decision 
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after decision, [Scheindlin] has found that cops have lied, discriminated against people of 
color, and violated the rights of citizens.”
187
   
In Scheindlin’s own words, she believes that “judges have a duty to protect 
individual rights because that’s what the Bill of Rights is all about.”
188
  “Sometimes there 
is no precedent that constrains you and you can really strike out and write what you think 
is the right answer.”
189
  The Floyd trial was her “greatest chance yet to rewrite the rules 
of engagement between the city’s police and its people.”
190
 
The evidence that Judge Scheindlin believes that NYPD officers lie, coupled with 
her handpicking of a stream of high-profile Section 1983 stop-and-frisk cases, and 
plaintiff-friendly outcomes in every single one of those cases, suggests at least an 
appearance of bias against the NYPD.  This alone is reason enough to do away with the 
related cases rule, which, as it stands, permits an outcome-oriented judge to manipulate 
the case assignment system so that a particular type of case accumulates on her docket 
alone. 
ii. An Appearance Of Bias Is Itself Reason To Eliminate 
Procedural Rules That Open The Door To Judicial Case-
Shopping 
 
Several courts have recognized that nonrandom case assignment procedures can 
lead to the appearance of bias, which on its own should be avoided.  In Cruz v. Abbate, 
four defendants in criminal cases pending in Guam Superior Court each moved for 
random assignment of his case to one of the seven judges on the court.
191
  The practice of 
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the Superior Court’s Presiding Judge was to assign each case to the judge of his choice.
192
  
Though Judge Kozinski, writing for the Ninth Circuit, noted that “a defendant has no 
right to any particular procedure for the selection of the judge” before whom his criminal 
case is heard, nevertheless, “he is entitled to have that decision made in a manner free 
from bias or the desire to influence the outcome.”
193
  
Though the court ultimately deemed the allegations of arbitrariness and unfairness 
too vague to address, the question raised was troubling enough for the opinion to include 
the pronouncement that courts “must take great pains to avoid any inference that [case] 
assignments are being made for an improper purpose,” because “[t]he suggestion that the 
case assignment process is being manipulated for motives other than the efficient 
administration of justice casts a very long shadow.”
194
 
A similar principle was also recognized in Yagman v. Baden, a case brought in the 
Central District of California, which was transferred shortly before trial when the 
presiding judge became ill.  The case was re-assigned to District Judge Manuel Real, not 
by random assignment, but through an order executed by both the original and transferee 
judge.
195
  The local rules expressly permitted voluntary transfer from one judge to 
another, so long as both consented.
196
  Though the Ninth Circuit again deemed the 
allegations that the transfer was “suspicious” too vague, it did note that “[c]ourts must be 
meticulously careful, when invoking direct transfer provisions . . . to avoid any improper 
appearance.”
197
  The court invoked the principle that guided the Supreme Court in In re 
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In Murchison, the Court overturned a Michigan conviction involving a trial court 
judge who had also served as a one-man grand jury on the very charges tried before 
him.
199
  The Court noted that the judge was likely unable to “free himself from the 
influence of what took place in his ‘grand-jury’ secret session,” and that “[h]is 
recollection of that is likely to weigh far more heavily with him than any testimony given 
in the open hearings.”
200
  Also, “the judge was doubtless more familiar with the facts and 
circumstances in which the charges were rooted than was any other witness.”
201
   
The procedure allowed by the Michigan court was itself unconstitutional, even in 
the absence of proof of actual prejudice, because it raised a probability of unfairness.
202
  
In the criminal context, fairness requires both the absence of “actual bias,” and also the 
absence of “the probability of unfairness.”
203
  At the extreme of this principle is the 
established notion that “no man can be a judge in his own case,” but the far subtler 
question is whether a judge can try cases in which he “has an interest in the outcome.”
204
   
 
What counts “an interest in the outcome” is a slippery question.  Traditional 
notions of familial or financial interest of course would apply, but a judge may also be 
“interested” in an outcome for personal reasons, intellectual interest, political agendas, or 
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even by the chance of case-related notoriety (good or bad).  But precisely because “an 
interest” cannot be defined, the safer course, at least in the criminal context, is to avoid 
procedures which offer even a temptation “not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true 
between the State and the accused,” as such procedures, on their own, violate due 
process.
205
  This is true even though such a rule “may sometimes bar trial by judges who 
have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice 
equally between contending parties.”
206
  “‘[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of 
justice.’”
207
   
The related case rule raises the same concern:  in Murchison, the judge may not 
have been able to “free himself from the influence of what took place in his ‘grand-jury’ 
secret session,” and in making the related cases decision, the judge deciding whether to 
accept a later-filed case may be unable to free herself from the influence of what occurred 
in the allegedly-related first-filed matter, over which the judge has also presided.   
Though they do not implicate an individual’s personal liberty, the stakes in civil 
rights litigation are also high.  The stop-and-frisk litigation before Judge Scheindlin has 
already cost the City of New York millions of dollars in fees, costs, and damage awards.  
The August 12, 2013 decision will also deplete city coffers.  As former NYPD first 
deputy commissioner John Timoney has explained: 
The training regimen laid out by Judge Scheindlin will 
require transferring dozens of officers from precincts and 
permanently reassigning them to the police academy as 
trainers.  Because minimum staffing levels are required by 
the department, much of the new training will have to be 
done on overtime, unless the city spends money to expand 
the number of officers. 
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Front-line ranking officers (sergeants and lieutenants) will 
likely require one week of training, while patrol officers 
and detectives will require at least two days.  My estimate 
is that this remedial process will cost tens of millions of 
dollars and last at least 10 years. This does not include the 
incalculable but sizable costs of taking an officer off patrol 
for training. Nor does it include the cost of the monitor, 
staff, expert advisers or the yet-to-be-named facilitator and 




The public interest at stake in stop-and-frisk litigation is twofold:  not only do residents 
of the City of New York have a right to their personal liberties, the same group of people 
also have a right to, for example, public housing, trash collection, and safe streets, 
amenities whose budgets are all affected by costly litigation, especially that which 
requires the purchase of bodyworn cameras and training officers on overtime pay. 
C. The Related Cases Rule Converts District Judges Who Hoard One 
Category Of Case Into Quasi-Appellate Judges 
 
The decisions of a single judge in one district are not binding on other judges in 
that same district.
209
  This principle respects the hierarchal structure of the federal court 
system.  Yet allowing one judge to collect a stream of factually distinct cases in order to 
affect a distinct area of the law elevates that judge over other judges in her district.  
Because no other judge has the opportunity to hear landmark stop-and-frisk cases, the 
judge who does hear the cases has the opportunity to shape the law in the same manner 
an appellate court would.   
Also, once an issue as important as the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk procedures reaches 
the appellate level of review, it will only have been vetted by one jurist.  A difference in 
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opinion may have guided the Second Circuit’s, and ultimately the Supreme Court’s, 
analysis of a complicated area of the law.  Yet when these cases are appealed, the higher 
courts will only have one voice to consider:  that of Judge Scheindlin.  This is, of course, 
her point. 
VI. THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT’S LOCAL RULES SHOULD BE 
AMENDED TO AVOID MANIPULATION OF CASE ASSIGNMENT 
PROCEDURES 
 
As this article highlights, it is far too simple to use the Southern District of New 
York’s case assignment rules to manipulate case assignments.  The current case 
assignment rules create an appearance of bias and facilitate case-shopping by district 
judges interested in a given case’s subject matter and outcome.  The below-proposed 
amendments to the Southern District’s rules would reinstate random case assignment as 
the default procedure. 
A. All Rules Permitting Subject-Matter-Specific Case Selection Should 
Be Eliminated 
 
There is no reason to permit senior judges or visiting judges to pre-select the 
“category” of cases he is willing to undertake.  First, with respect to senior judges, their 
caseloads can be lessened by permitting them to advise the Southern District as to the 
number of cases they are willing to take—a consideration already in place in the Southern 
District.  There is no reason to also allow them to craft a specialized docket, as this sort of 
subject-matter-specific case selection could result in assignment of an entire category of 
cases (Section 1983, habeas, securities) to one judge alone.  Senior or otherwise, district 
judges are appointed to the federal bench to hear all cases.  And there are opportunities 
within the federal courts for judges who want to hear only a limited category of cases, 




The Southern District of New York, however, is not a specialized court, and any judge 
appointed to the Southern District should not become a specialized judge. 
Second, there is also no reason to allow visiting judges to pre-select the category 
of case he is willing to accept.  Again, the workload given to visiting judges can be 
lessened by limiting the number of cases a visiting judge takes on—a safeguard already 
in place in the Southern District’s rules.  Moreover, visiting judges are only permitted to 
visit a court other than the one to which they were appointed when the need for such a 
visit arises in the court they visit.  Allowing visiting judges to pre-select the category of 
cases permits them to pre-select the kind of cases they wish to hear, which risks assigning 
an entire category of cases disproportionately to one judge.  In addition, this practice 
undermines the purpose of allowing judges to visit other courts; the practice is intended 
to service the courts’ certified needs, not the judge’s jurisprudential interests.   
Third, the transfer of related cases rule, which gives the judge to whom a case is 
referred as potentially related with “sole discretion” to accept or reject a later-filed case, 
precludes any examination of actual relatedness, and facilitates the hoarding of cases 
based on subject matter.  Similarly, the “transfer of cases by consent” rule, which allows 
any judge to “transfer directly any case or any part of any case . . . to any consenting 
judge” on the Southern District, endorses a secret conversation between judges about 
which kind of cases they want on their dockets, and then permits transfer of cases for 
reasons both proper and improper.  These practices eviscerate random case assignment, 
and endorse case transfer for any reason the transferor or transferee judge has in mind.  
Perhaps worst of all, the reason is never made public and is not subject to challenge by 




B.  All Assignment Committee Decisions Should Be Made Public 
 
Given the complicated nature of federal litigation, there is obviously a need for 
district-wide committees that oversee and manage certain aspects of case assignment.  
But there is no reason to keep such decisions hidden from the public.  Moreover, the 
members of the assignment committee should be made known.  The Southern District of 
New York’s assignment committee “rule[s] upon all issues relating to assignments,” but 
what exactly “issues related to assignments” are is not explained.  Without full disclosure 
of case assignment decisions, the Southern District risks an appearance of bias and 
impropriety in its case assignment methods.  If the system is fair, there is no reason to 
hide it from the public and the parties subject to the committee’s decisions. 
C. The Related Cases Determination Should Be Subject To Motion 
Practice  
 
As written, the related cases rule leaves the decision to accept a later-filed case as 
related to an earlier-filed matter within the sole discretion of the judge to whom the 
potentially related case is referred.  As explained above, this creates the appearance of 
bias and incentivizes judicial case-shopping.  But even if the rule is rewritten to take the 
decision out of the hands of the judge to whom the case is referred, the related cases rule 
remains problematic.   
A party who advocates for the related case designation likely wants to appear in 
front of the judge who handled the earlier case—as has clearly happened in stop-and-frisk 
litigation.  Given the potential granting of the assignment, that party should be required to 
move for the related case designation, and the other party allowed to oppose.  Moreover, 
that motion should not be heard by the judge to whom the case is originally assigned, as 




it heard by the judge presiding over the earlier-filed case, who may have reasons to take 
on the case’s subject matter.  Rather, this is precisely the kind of motion appropriately 
heard by the assignment committee.   
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
That the NYPD stop-and-frisk litigation is venued in the Southern District of New 
York is significant.  The Southern District is one of the most influential federal courts.
210
  
An appointment to the Southern District of New York is prestigious, and may lead, as in 
the case of Justice Sonia Sotomayor, to the Supreme Court.
211
  The Southern District is 
also “an ‘important venue for corporate and white-collar prosecutions, and its 
pronouncements are highly influential.’”
212
  Judge Scheindlin herself is an oft-cited jurist, 
whose opinion in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC
213
 is regarded as one of the most 
important decisions regarding e-discovery;
214
 her decisions are “must-reads.”
215
  She has 
also issued important orders in the context of the federal material witness statute.
216
   
Additional reasons suggest that the Fourth Amendment litigation pending before 
Judge Scheindlin will have far-reaching impact.  Daniels, Davis, Floyd and Ligon have 
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each already garnered attention in academic scholarship.
217
  The Floyd trial was the 
subject of multiple New York Times op-ed pieces, all highly critical of the NYPD’s stop-
and-frisk practices.
218
  At least one scholar has argued that the burdens Terry stops inflict 
“are most visible in New York.”
219
  A June 2012 protest against the NYPD’s stop-and-
frisk practices was covered extensively not only by New York media outlets, but also by 
The Guardian and Al Jazeera.
220
   
“National experts have publicly debated the role of the stop-and-frisk program in 
either producing or threatening New York City’s vaunted crime drop of the past two 
decades.”
221
  The survival or demise of New York City’s stop-and-frisk regime may 
impact the decision to pursue similar police tactics in other large metropolitan areas, such 
as Philadelphia and San Francisco.
222
  Philadelphia and Los Angeles compile data, as 
New York did, on “stops and frisks,”
223
 and a ruling in the Scheindlin cases may 
encourage costly litigation in those cities.   
The NYPD’s current stop-and-frisk practices are arguably a reflection of the 
Supreme Court’s extension of police authority post-Terry.
224
  If any of Scheindlin’s 
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decisions are appealed to the Supreme Court, they may have the opposite outcome of the 
one Judge Scheindlin intended.  The current Court has not hesitated to expand police 
authority.  If given the chance to review Judge Scheindlin’s broad expansion of Fourth 
Amendment rights, the Court may reverse her decisions, and contract the rights at 
issue.
225
   
Like the Fifth Circuit judge who packed civil rights cases with desegregationist 
judges, Judge Scheindlin’s positions may be guided by the right moral compass and 
ultimately vindicated, if not by the Supreme Court, then by history.  But the manner in 
which the Southern District of New York’s local rules have allowed one judge to select 
certain cases, and use them to shape the development of important Constitutional law, 
gives off such an appearance of impropriety that the procedures that allow for such 
practices must be eliminated.  “[T]o perform its high function in the best way, justice 
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